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1 Introduction: Neuroeconomics, an inchoative field
1.1 What’s Neuroeconomics?
«Neuroeconomics», a hitherto blurred concept, mirroring an inchoative field The
concept of «Neuroeconomics» appeared recently in the field of economics. Colin Camerer
and some other pioneer peers (Camerer et al., 2003) wrote a survey, «Neuroeconomics»,
which connotes the desire to institutionalize the new symbiosis between imaging neuro-
science and experimental economics. We can assign this scientific project to the develop-
ment of modern techniques – like the Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and the
Positron Emission Topography – used in the lab by neuroscience to visualize the cortical
regions activated while performing controlled tasks. As pointed out by the authors, these
recent technical devices allow to go beyond behaviorism by «opening the black box of the
brain»1 and thereby match the realistic project to understand the human being.
Yet the epistemological nature of such an attempted integration is not addressed by
the authors of this handout, aimed at presenting together some nice neural results liable
to arouse the economist’s interest. Such a «captatio benevolentiae» is not designed to
pin down the paradigm of neuroeconomics, nor its institutional borders and functioning.
To that extent, the extensive use of the label «Neuroeconomics» is more of a practical
nature than of a reflexive one. That’s what we call the «indigenous» concept of «Neuroe-
conomics», that we distinguish from the «epistemological» concept of neuroeconomics.
It is not our goal to minimize this first step, which is having a great impact in making
a bunch of recent researches converge toward the idea of more realism in economics and
more unity in behavioural sciences2. Our objective is rather to outline basic aspects of
1An analogue opening was done in the past regarding the firm, first trivialized by the neoclassic
economists before March and Simon’s insights suggested new scientific examinations.
2It definitely helps to define new lines and new positions in the moving field of experimental and
behavioural economics. Though it lets the epistemological foundations open up for the future.
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a possible epistemological coherence of the research that sprouts today under the label
of neuroeconomics. We think it is time for neuroeconomics to position itself within the
field of economics, to construe its aims and scope3.
Epistemological definition of the concept of neuroeconomics A preliminary defini-
tion of the epistemological concept of neuroeconomics is the very minimal condition for
this to be carried out. We define neuroeconomics as the joint experimental production
between neural sciences and experimental economics. It is a natural outgrowth of labo-
ratory economics, aimed at studying behaviour in a controlled environment.
Two remarks are to be made at this stage:
• First it is necessary to justify our definition of neuroeconomics as joint production
between different sciences. Indeed it presupposes a real interdisciplinary collabora-
tion between economists and neuroscientists, one that would fulfil the promise of
incorporation or integration. It appeals some common principle, since the cross-
breeding of several fields – psychology, neurobiology, normative economics – into
some, to be sure, quite elaborate experimental settings, is not by itself a unification
of these fields, of their methods, nor of the principles that found them4.
One way to foresee epistemological soundness is to follow Popper in asserting that
a common principle of rationality provides the ultimate unity of behavioural and
social sciences (Popper, 1967). This common principle constitutes the cement of
neuroeconomics. Indeed some epistemological coherence can be fostered by the
consideration that the ways of interpreting behaviour that each of these fields ap-
plies rely on a common principle of rationality. Namely the epistemological unity
of the different aspects – psychological, neurobiological and economical – of exper-
imental data provided by neuroeconomics studies, are implicitly unified because it
is presumed that in one way or another the agent systematically follows some rea-
sons that can explain her apparent behaviour. This principle needs not be qualified
in general, but it can be qualified in the various situations that the agent meets;
and what specific experimental data may contribute to provide is precisely those
3This epistemological enterprise is, of course, quite compatible with a more practical or strategic one,
as its outcome will be to get a better appraisal of the situation of neuroeconomics in the field: in
particular it is not insignificant to know whether it stands closer to experimental economics than to
psychology-oriented behavioural economics.
4Indeed, why would the cross-breeding between the two different fields not reduce to a mere col-
laboration between neuroscience and economics? The latter would «pick and choose», among the
neural solidified data, the ones that match their interests. They would use them as «inputs» in the
production of economic knowledge. Neurobiological data would provide then an external source of
information for the understanding of human behaviour pursued in usual economic terms, but there
would not be, as such, a more profound epistemological reflection as to know why those neurobi-
ological data can constitute data that import for the understanding of economic behaviour. Once
cognitive functions have been attributed to certain brain areas, it would be the purely external job
of the so-called neuroeconomist to relate them to cognitive tasks or states that have an interest for
the economist tout court: choice, decision, anticipation, regret, etc. Then neuroeconomics would not
be a joint production, but an «epistemic outsourcing».
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local justifications that are needed in view of the whole coherent account of human
behaviour.
Therefore we are entitled to think of neuroeconomics as a real incorporation lead-
ing to the previously alleged «joint production», because of the shared rationality
principle.
• Second notice that our provisional definition purportedly restricts neuroeconomics
to the experimental domain of economics. We will spend a few time in this article to
raise some major issues related to the experimental specificities of neuroeconomics5.
Though we will mainly focus on the relation between neuroeconomics and the «a
priori domain»6 of economics: papers in economics can be now illustrated with
pictures of the brain, but how these pictures can be an element of economic the-
orizing? The purpose of this article is to show and illustrate the following thesis.
There are three possible main views of how neuroeconomics may relate to eco-
nomics: neural data can be used to test, to hypothesize, or to induct. According
to which of these three views – respectively Deduction, Abduction, and Induction
– is privileged, neuroeconomics may be said to be established as epistemologically
autonomous or not. The first view is an hypothetical-deductive understanding of
economics. Neural data obtained in specific experimental settings are confirmatory
data, relevant only to the extent that they constitute a way of testing existing
theories. They lend the latter a veneer of realism in the sense that descriptions
of brain-mechanisms can be seen as specific tests of behavioural predictions made
by the theory. We show that this hypothetical-deductive approach leads to an
«epistemological circle» and should definitely be considered as a dead-end.
Now the connections between neural functioning and economics can be encom-
passed in quite a different epistemological framework, one which we recommend
and illustrate in the following. An abductive understanding of those connections
amounts to consider that neural data – now endowed with scientific primacy – may
help build hypotheses or refine extant ones in order to create maximal compatibility
between data and theoretical premisses. Abduction, here, means that neural data
are not, as such, predicted or deduced by theoretical premises of economics. Dif-
ferently, they serve to update the models by suggesting new hypothesis and urging
new insights.
The abductive conception of economics urges behavioral economists toward a greater
heuristic (adaptation of one’s hypotheses to account for new data) and hermeneu-
tic (emphasis put on the purpose of explaining human behavior in all its relevant
manifestations for economists) understanding of their task. Still the primacy of
the existing theories remains, to the extent that the new hypothesis are a way of
5In particular we suggest important methodological differences between neuroeconomics experiments
and laboratory economics.
6The theoretical domain of economics, namely the domain of the economic models, is referred to by
Machlup as the «a priori domain» (Machlup, 1980). In the following development we will use the
two expressions indifferently.
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rationalizing – by updating them – the latter. The essence of neuroeconomics is
not abduction according to us. We point to a somewhat ideal epistemological rela-
tion between neural data and economics that would constitute neuroeconomics as a
fully epistemologically autonomous scientific discipline. This relation is inductive.
It means an extension of the behavioral topics of interest. Empirical exploration
comes first, then the models intervene in a second – still essential – step7. Once
the researcher is involved in an inductive logic, each new empirical fact helping at
understanding the way human-being actually functions will be meaningful, even
though no economic model has ever dropped an anchor in this new direction. This
inductive pathway is possible only to the extent that neuroeconomics rests on the
common rationality principle mentioned before. The latter both suppresses the
institutional delimitation between the traditional objects of interest proper to each
field, and the primacy of preexisting theories.
1.2 Aims of this article
Which epistemological pathway for neuroeconomics The necessity of such an effort
at epistemological foundations has been foreseen by some authors. A recent instance is
an introduction to a volume of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the new field
of neuroeconomics (Rustichini, 2005). The author, Aldo Rustichini, encompasses the
use of tools, concepts and methods of neuroscience in economic analyses under the gen-
eral idea of understanding the processes that underlie behaviour which are predicted by
axiomatic Decision Theory and Game Theory. It seems to us that Rustichini program-
matically addresses important questions for anyone involved in the deductive approach
we previously mentioned: what can theoretical economics learn from neuroeconomics?
Can neuroeconomics pretend to contradict the axiomatic models? Though it also seems
that he simply suggests a very broad outline of the epistemology that could provide
satisfactory answers to them.
Rustichini’s broad epistemological perspective is to re-unite current economics with
the research program that was once the one of early classics like Hume and Smith, who,
according to Rustichini, sought to provide a unified theory of human behaviour. Isolated
experimental data and observations won’t make sufficient sense, then, and can always be
the prey of sceptical rebuttal, if one does not endeavour to say why these new types of
data about human behaviour enter into a unified view of human sciences whose economics
is the backbone. Now special justification is provided in the cases of a phenomenon
like cooperation in competitive games, once thought an irrational deviation from utility
maximization. Rustichini, at this juncture, directly echoes Adam Smith’s views: what
holds society together and makes possible trade, competition and the whole realm of
7The models would be heuristic devices to illuminate the empirical facts. Our use of the term «heuristic»
must be understood in a pragmatic sense, as an alternative criterion to the ontological one to judge
the economic models. We deny that the ontological ingredient – is this model true or false? – is
necessary to have a warranted epistemological belief that some models are better than others: a
given model is good if it helps to understand some targeted aspects of the real order built by the
experimental domain. Echoing Ian Hacking’s terminology, we will call our epistemological viewpoint
«anti-realist about theories and realist about entities» (Hacking, 1983).
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economics, is a feeling such as sympathy which counterbalances selfishness. There are
some social emotions which provide the cement of society. Interestingly enough, as we
will see in more details below, this is what neuroeconomics, in its current stage, looks for
in priority: it explains, for example, deviations from pure rationality in the ultimatum
game, by the presence in the subject, well attested by neural data, of emotions such as
trust, disgust, or revenge. This is, indeed, an indication of where neuroeconomics might
head to, but this is far from offering, or even pointing to, a unified theory of human
behaviour as such, and we expect more epistemological discussion, apart from prestigious
ancestry, in favour of this view. Our guess is that Rustichini implicitly equates economics
with the traditional objects of interest of social science, in particular the individual
underpinnings of social exchange. In this logic, the move toward more realism, allowed
by new information provided by neuroeconomics, would lead to a new look on these
preexisting objects.
As it should clearly appear, Rustichini’s Smithian viewpoint epitomizes our abductive
view of economic science. Our Popperian answer to the raison d’etre of neuroeconomics
is quite different: first we do not restrict a priori the scope of economics, and postulate
that neuroeconomics will encompass new objects of interest, to the extent that the latter
will be integrated in the rationalization process. Second the common rationality principle
implies a change in the relation between theory and experience within economics, shifting
it from deduction towards induction.
The first part of this article is descriptive: our motivation is to shed light on the
emergence of neuroeconomics as a scientific project. We point to the conditions of the
emergence of neuroeconomics, by emphasizing intellectual factors, in addition to strate-
gic and institutional ones. We show that the neuroeconomics project can be equated
with the final step of an ongoing evolution of economics toward more realism. While
the axiomatic approach is still flourishing, an alternative humanistic ethos leads to ex-
perimental economics and its theoretical counterpart, behavioural economics. Both aim
at understanding the real world. Neuroeconomics, an «outgrowth» of experimental eco-
nomics, epitomizes this modern ethos.
The remaining of the article is normative: the objective is to determine the optimal
relation between neuroeconomics and the theoretical domain. First we explain why the
hypothetical-deductive approach is not relevant, by pointing to some specific aspects
of neuroeconomics experiments, that prevent the confirmatory use of neural data. In
particular we show that a qualitative (interpretative) stage is intrinsic to the construction
of the experimental fact in neuroeconomics. Then we define the abductive pathway and
illustrate its relevance through examples from the recent neuroeconomics literature. Last
we try to convince the reader that the essence of the neuroeconomics project is inductive,
and suggest some potentially fruitful research plans within this epistemological scheme.
Scientific stakes Before taking the reader any further in the epistemological assess-
ment of the field of neuroeconomics, a conceptual precision is required. We think of the
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production of scientific knowledge8 as a dynamic Polya process. Before justifying such
a claim, let us recall briefly what a Polya process is. Polya studied the evolution of
the number of balls in an urn with infinite capacity. At the beginning of the process,
the urn contains one red ball and one white ball. A new ball is added at each period,
and its color – red or white – depends on the proportion of the balls having the same
color, already present in the urn9. Hence the transition probabilities are endogenous.
The characterization of the equilibrium of the process is twofold. While the proportion
of red balls tends toward a limit, the solution is undetermined10. To put it differently,
the arbitrary «starting point» is crucial, since the final situation (lock-in) depends on
it, through the endogenous transition probability. That’s what B.W.Arthur and al. call
«path dependency» (Arthur, 1994) and (Arthur et al., 1987), intrinsic to non ergod-
icity11. The analogy with the epistemic process is as follows: at each period of time, the
scientific community is to choose a particular object of interest from a set of potential
scientific objects. The reasonable assumption we make is that the probability to choose
a particular object of interest crucially depends on the previous choices12. As this pro-
cess is characterized by non ergodicity, we should be particularly cautious regarding the
initial conditions, since they largely determine the «borderline», the scientific horizon of
the discipline. Therefore the ex ante epistemological moment is fundamental. The initial
choices must be objectified and construed before neuroeconomics becomes shaped into
a structured «field» (Bourdieu, 1978). Let us say metaphorically that it is necessary
to pin down the nature of the different «balls» in our epistemic urn. This article is a
tentative move in favor of this enterprise. More precisely, we claim that good starting
conditions for neuroeconomics privilege hitherto unexplored objects over the ancestral
topics directly derived from social sciences. Induction is a necessary condition for such
an extension of the set of relevant topics.
2 How did «Neuroeconomics» appear?
2.1 Intellectual and institutional factors: axiology of Economics as a
structured scientific field
Motion towards more realism It is necessary to outline some important institutional
transformations of the economics field in order to fully understand the current develop-
8Henceforth we will use the term «epistemic» to refer to this production of knowledge and its scientific
outputs. Therefore in our terminology «epistemic» and «epistemological» are not synonymous. The
latter encapsulates the notion of reflexivity: epistemology takes some epistemic phenomena as its
objects of reflection.
9For instance, assume that the new ball will have the same color as the ball it hits first.
10The value susceptible to emerge is uniformly distributed within the interval [0, 1].
11Ergodicity is an attribute of stochastic systems that tend in probability to a limiting form that is
independent of the initial conditions.
12The microfoundations leading to endogenous transition probabilities can be resumed as follows: each
researcher is to some extent a beckerian actor aimed at her reputation within the field and thereby
does not have an individual incentive to deviate from the mainstream topics. To put it differently it
is one’s best interest to imitate the ongoing choices. Hence a deviation from the initial trend is, at
the aggregate level, unlikely.
6
ment of neuroeconomics.
Indeed the personality of such «empiricist» leaders like Colin Camerer and Ernst Fehr
is not a sufficient reason for the emergence of the collaboration between neurologists
and economists. Nor is sufficient the recent development of the new imaging techniques,
that makes possible the examination of the neural underpinnings of observed behavioral
patterns. Actually this scientific project is the manifestation of some deeper structural
factor, some «habitus» 13. At this stage it is noteworthy that the realistic ethos sug-
gesting to «open the black box of the brain» is not the mainstream in the economics of
decision theory. It mirrors a modern trend towards more realism, born in the seventies
thanks to Kahneman and Tversky’s insights14. While it is clearly opposed to the for-
malistic approach (the Chicago School one), which crowds out any problem that cannot
be presented in mathematical form, it rests on the humanistic desire to understand the
human-being and its manifold behavior. Kahneman and Tversky showed in an elegant
and understandable fashion the weakness of the predictions delivered by the classical
theories of individual decision-making15. Therefore the testability criterion, put forth by
the dominant economists to legitimate their mathematical constructions, could no longer
deceive the profession.
In addition to this intellectual milestone, the legitimacy of these two polyvalent figures
– Amos Tversky was psychologist, philosopher, and excellent mathematician – deeply
embedded in the American academic field, their scientific proximity with the prominent
economist Richard H.Thaler, were conducive to a real «intellectual revolution». Thus,
according to David Laibson and Richard Zeckhauser (Laibson and Zeckhauser, 1998),
they initiated «the modern behavioral economics»16 of the late nineties – the label comes
from Richard H.Thaler (Thaler, 1997). Indeed Richard H.Thaler, George Loewenstein,
David Laibson, Richard Zeckhauser, all prominent leaders in the field, refuse the escapism
consisting of neglecting the real world to preserve the tractability of the models. Their
common claim is «to start updating our equations to include these behavioral factors»
(Thaler, 1997).
To some extent, this move towards more realism is a return to Marshall17 – and more
broadly to the pre-thirties epistemic ethos – after the enduring formalism period which
started with Samuelson’s «Foundations»(Samuelson, 1947). Rustichini’s recent article
– the one we previously mentioned – is a manifest illustration of this new mood. So is the
actual proximity between economics and psychology. While some researchers can’t be
subsumed under one peculiar field18, others like Jonathan Cohen, an eminent neurosci-
13See Bourdieu (1990) and Bourdieu (1977).
14See in particular Kahneman and Tversky (1972).
15The deviations from the predictions, for being systematic, could not be assigned to individual noises
any more (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996).
16To many aspects the microeconomic analogue of the neokeynesianism vis-a-vis the classical macroe-
conomics.
17See Pigou’s apology of Marshall (Pigou, 1925). Pigou stresses Marshall’s cautiousness regarding math-
ematical formalism in economics: the mathematical constructions should not become «intellectual
toys» freeing us from questioning the real world.
18Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky illustrate evidently this syncretism. Other researchers do, for
example Eldar Shafir and Robyn A.Leboeuf, researchers in psychology whose interests and hitherto
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entist and doctor, have a clear and asserted open-mindedness towards other disciplines.
Experimental designs used by neuroeconomics also signals hybridization borrowing as
much to experimental psychology as to experimental economics19.
We view neuroeconomics as the latest manifestation of this realistic frame of mind. As
we explained in introduction, Karl Popper’s «rationality principle» envelops this realist
ethos, common to the cognitive sciences: neuroeconomics is a piece in the whole ratio-
nalization enterprise. The unified behavioral science focuses on the reasons underlying
our behaviors, and each piece of evidence that helps at illuminating these reasons shall
be entitled within the new discipline.
Thus we exhumed the condition of possibility of the neuroeconomics project, namely
the new realistic ethos and the technical possibility to go beyond behaviorism, to inves-
tigate the observed behaviors, through imaging neurology.
Neuroeconomics and Laboratory Economics are coterminous Actually neuroeco-
nomics is the natural outgrowth of the behavioral experiments. More precisely, the
realistic ethos is conducive to two intertwined programs, a quantitative one, and a qual-
itative one. The first one refers to the experimental designs (collection of the empirical
data)20, while the second refers to the interpretations of the neural data (construction
of the empirical facts). Let us describe the quantitative practice first. The project to
encapsulate the real behaviors through rigorous scrutiny leads to the cautious construc-
tion of behavioral facts through experimental designs in a controlled environment (the
lab). Then, the desire to flesh out puzzling phenomena is conducive to the brain imaging
phase. Actually brain imaging analysis is an inductive experimental phase to answer the
question: what do these experimentally established behavioural facts mean, how do they
hint to basic information about human nature?
At this stage some epistemological lucidity should be fully exerted: the visualization
of specific neural regions which are activated during the controlled experiments does not
allow per se to correlate the activation of a zone to a concomitant behaviour. Only the
replication of the same co-occurrence may lead to the association between a given neural
region and a behavioral pattern21. To put it differently, a correlation does exist if it has
scientific contribution perfectly match the questions of those economists who are sensitive to psy-
chology (Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002). Dan Ariely’s joint production with eminent economists –
in particular Drazen Prelec and George Loewenstein – is another manifest example of the actual
cross-breeding between psychology and economics. See for instance Ariely et al. (2003) and Ariely
et al. (forthcoming).
19For example the «non deception rule» is a «sacred principle» for experimental economics, whereas
psychologists commonly use deception within their experiments. However, some experiments in
neuroeconomics introduce deception in their design. See for example (Rilling et al., 2002). In one
of the sessions, the subject thinks she is playing with a human, while she actually plays with the
computer.
20This quantitative stage is itself twofold: core behavioral experiments are complemented, if necessary,
by sequences of brain imaging; the data are therefore sequentially behavioral and neural.
21Let us illustrate this point with a specific example. Resorting to brain-imaging, neurologists designate
the striatum as a «zone of reward» encoding satisfaction feelings. This brain area has been found
to be systematically activated during pleasurable experiences. The label «zone of reward» is not a
reification, but a handy practical concept used to refer to this established correlation.
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been observed a sufficiently large number of times. Therefore neuroeconomics data are
the product of a «solidification» process, and if not «solidified», they cannot pretend to
be established results.
Once we get real neuroeconomics data, the interpretative phase intervenes. This heuris-
tic stage is not empirical in the strict sense, it lies in the construction of the empirical
fact by qualitative reasoning: what does this observed correlation mean? Here a new
caveat emerges, because such a qualitative discourse does not rest on strong inference
(Platt, 1964)22. More precisely, the correlation between typical patterns of behaviour
and brain areas is not necessarily one to one. For example, a region on which neuroe-
conomists have especially focussed their attention, the insula, has been implicated in the
recognition and experience of disgust, sadness and fear. As J.Morris emphasizes: «The
diverse nature of these activations suggests that insula has a generalized role that is not
specific to any particular emotion of behavioural context» (Morris, 2002). Moreover
insula is highly anatomically connected to other regions in the brain such as amygdala,
equally well known for their role in processing emotions. What we find, then, is a set
of neurobiological data connected to a manifold of patterns of behaviour and manifest
emotional reactions.
Hence the fallacious association between one given neural region and one given psy-
chological state can be equated with what we shall call «a bijection fallacy». The latter
is a real epistemological issue, because it makes the inference process far more tricky
and thereby vitiates the neuroeconomics project if not seriously withstood. Barring this
concern it remains true that the controlled behavioural experiments, by triggering typi-
cal manifest reactions, such as arousal of a variety of emotions, might help charting the
functional map of specific areas in the brain. And reciprocally, it might be that neural
data will help to appraise the emotional and cognitive underpinnings of our behaviors.
This possible scientific «symbiosis»23 between the disciplines is naturally enticing. Still
we should keep in mind what we call the «bijection fallacy», and we advocate an extreme
cautiousness in the interpretation of the neural data.
This point leads to the following recommendation: neuroeconomics should not serve
as a way of testing preexisting theories, to the extent that the risk of bias – towards
the confirmation of the tested theories – in the interpretative phase of the experiments
is high, due to the weak inference property inherent to this qualitative stage. To put
it in another way, using neuroeconomics to test some existing theories would lead to a
pernicious «epistemological circle»: the achieved experimental result is actually derived
from the theory, and thereby is tautological, at least a very weak signal in favor of the
22Assume that one has a (testable) theoretical proposition A in mind and makes an experimental design
so as to test this proposition. The experimental design produces two possible outcomes, a and a¯. If a¯
is observed, then the probability that A is true is 0. This is strong inference. For example, Kahneman
and Tversky chose peculiar problems to get clear results: if the subject follows an intuitive approach,
she will give a wrong answer. The error is an unambiguous signal that the subject uses intuition
when facing the cognitive task. But for lots of similar analytical problems, the intuitive answer and
the rational one match (Lopes, 1991).
23Experimental economics may contribute to the elaboration of data and hypotheses in the investigation
of brain functions, and behavioral economics would use the functional map of specific regions to
«read» behind observed behaviors.
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theory. Therefore a deductive use of neuroeconomics is the wrong track.
We indicate two possible epistemological understandings of the relation between neu-
roeconomics and theoretical economics, an abductive vision, and an inductive one. The
first one bypasses the epistemological circle issue, and leads instead to extremely fruitful
insights. still it is not inherent to the neuroeconomics project either; only a real inductive
frame of mind is such, according to us.
3 Neuroeconomics as abduction
3.1 New look on old objects
Modern behavioral economics seeks to make classical economics models sensitive to re-
calcitrant empirical facts. A canonical example is Fehr and Schmidt’s model of fairness
and cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), which updated the hitherto oversimplified
economics models. Indeed experimental economics established in the lab the existence of
both positive and negative reciprocity. While playing the ultimatum game, subjects who
are facing an unfair offer have a propensity to reject it, even though from a purely ra-
tional viewpoint, they should accept the deal24. This behavioural pattern is puzzling for
the standard economist, since the rejection of the unfair offer is – economically speaking
– costly. No less puzzling is the high degree of mutual cooperation when subjects play
prisoner dilemma games in the lab. Standard economists predict the opposite, namely
the disastrous suboptimal outcome of a mutual defection25. Actually the empirical nega-
tion of the standard economics benchmark turned out to be extremely fruitful, to the
extent that it was conducive to new hypotheses. Not only did they serve as core as-
sumptions in the improved behavioural models, but they also allowed new investigations,
carried out by neuroeconomists26. The original models are not thrown away for being
empirically refutated, but «updated». This suggests that in the rationalization process,
new hypotheses27 are going to be construed, to accommodate the models (henceforward
we shall use the term premises to design the latter) with the empirical data.
We characterize this dialectical process of serial hypothesis construction as an abduc-
tive one. We call it abductive28 in the sense that what is properly targeted in abductive
reasoning is not properly a conclusion, but the intermediary theoretical premises that
would, given general scientific laws, lead to an already observed conclusion. There is an
interpretative leeway that is opened by abduction, to the extent that what is primarily
24By rejecting the unfair offer the player gets nothing (and the proposer also gets nothing), while by
accepting the player gets something (and the proposer takes the remainder). Under the commonly
accepted non satiation assumption, the player should accept even the mere nothing – still better than
nothing at all.
25When the maximization of one’s own payoff is the objective of each player – and this is a common
knowledge – the Nash equilibrium arising is the inefficient mutual defection.
26For example, once we take for granted that pro-social behavior is a common pattern in a specific
context, it is the role of neuroeconomics to flesh out the mechanisms involved.
27To wit new reasons, new causes explaining what is observed.
28We collapse here scientific and individual cognition as joint instances of idealized processes of reasoning
and we follow Niiniluoto (Niiniluoto, 1999) in our definition of abduction.
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sought, given a sufficiently articulated set of theoretical major premises in a problem and
a sufficiently well observed phenomenon that is supposed to derive from a particular ap-
plication of the major premises to a case, is a partition of possible answers to a problem
rather than a single one. So likeliness, relevance, and further confirmatory data will help
determine which set of hypotheses is liable to derive the observed results: the partition
becomes less and less coarse. Neuroeconomics, by exploring the neural underpinnings of
controlled behaviors, largely participates to the refinement of the partition.
Notice that the use of an abductive methodology does not present itself as the rival
of the hypothetical-deductive methodology of normative economics. By essence it does
not impart any substantial modification over its basic epistemological structure which
may well lay beyond the reach of local adaptation of the theoretical sources of predictive
power of economics and freshly acquired relevant data. This spirit of local modifica-
tion and adaptation of economics is what seems to have been adopted by behavioural
economics. This could be considered a major reason why neuroeconomics, when un-
derstood and fostered in priority by behavioural economists, does not, at institutional
and epistemological levels, as we have already hinted, lead to a deep epistemological
reshaping of economics29. Behavioural economics, extended to the use of neuroscience
techniques, data and interpretation does not entail an epistemological overturn of eco-
nomics. The research program of «economics and psychology», in the hand of researchers
like Camerer or others, is sensitive to all kinds of data that reveal systematic deviations
from the predictions of the rational theory of choice, but once we have accommodated
these deviations in the utility functions by incorporating relevant parameters, we have in
no way changed the deep epistemological functioning of normative economics. We have,
however, disclosed its conceptual openness30.
Various recent experiments in neuroeconomics are instances of the abductive process
we have just described. More precisely neuroeconomics intervene at the level of the
interpretative leeway mentioned before, aimed at reconciliate the theoretical premises
with experience. For instance the rejection of an unfair offer in the ultimatum game is
puzzling insofar as the only heuristic tools which are available to us are the standard
economics models. The partition of hypothesis aimed at rationalizing this empirical fact
within the previous – properly updated – theoretical frame can be refined thanks to
neuroeconomics experiments. To illustrate the way neuroeconomics constructs plausible
hypotheses from its experimental designs, we develop three examples issued from the
recent neuroeconomics literature.
29This adaptative motion leaves the possibility of an incredulous or unconvinced stare in the eyes either
of those who wish to preserve the actual and parsimonious normative models of rational behaviour
or of those who wish to encompass neurobiological data in a more comprehensive view of rationality
and human behaviour.
30Notice that in this abductive process, the epistemological status of the theoretical models, in weberian
terminology, is tantamount to an «ideal-type»: far from being considered as empirically valid, the
model is a heuristic «tool» to appraise reality (Weber, 1949).
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3.2 Illustrative Examples
Reciprocity is a manifest «Smithian» object of interest. Behavioral economics showed
that reciprocity is not an imaginary notion, but has an experimental robust anchoring.
As standard economics cannot rationalize properly reciprocity, reciprocity plays therefore
the role of compelling empirical fact in our abductive scheme.
Understand negative reciprocity How to rationalize the rejection of the unfair offer in
the ultimatum game? The partition of hypothesis offered by neuroeconomics reintroduces
the hitherto neglected limbic (emotional) dimension to explain how we really behave, and
makes negative reciprocity more understandable.
First Jonathan Cohen and al. construed an experimental design under functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI ) in order to pin down the neural underpinnings of the
decision to reject an unfair offer in the ultimatum game (Cohen et al., 2003). The high
level of sensitivity of the right anterior insula to the degree of unfairness, in addition to the
negative correlation between the right anterior insula activation and the acceptance rate,
suggests that an emotional factor might be conducive to the refusal. More precisely the
rejection might be the manifestation of moral disgust31 while facing an unfair offer. The
decision to reject would mean that the cognitive goal of accumulating money – mirrored
by the steady activation of the prefrontal cortex – is overwhelmed by the emotional
goal of resisting unfairness. Therefore standard economics, by focusing exclusively on
the rational motives, neglected the limbic dimension and trivialized the decision-making
process, reduced to only one dimension.
In the same vein Dominique de Quervain and al. (de Quervain et al., 2004) provided
a complementary insight on negative reciprocity, through a Positron Emission Topog-
raphy (PET ) experiment. The objective is to understand the willingness to punish an
untrustworthy person in the trust game. In this dynamic exchange game, the first movers
start by giving their endowment to the second movers, who then decide either to share,
or to keep all. The first movers are under imaging scrutiny: in an additional step, they
are allowed to punish the unfair partner, and they choose the amount of the punishment
during a one minute deliberation period. The PET measure is restricted to this period.
To appraise the hypothesized satisfaction derived from the punishment, the experimen-
tal design contrasts a «symbolic punishment» condition with an «effective punishment»
one32. The anterior striatum and thalamus specific activations suggest that there is a
satisfaction derived from the punishment.
The underpinnings of social exchange and trust On the other hand, positive reci-
procity has been studied by James Rilling and al. using an fMRI procedure during an
31The correspondence between insula activation and disgust (physical or moral) is consensual among the
imaging neuroscientists. As previously explained, it is the result of an inductive assignment, likened
to the replication of experimental conditions involving disgust.
32The subject knows that the (economic) punishment is purely symbolic in the first case (it won’t hurt
the punished partner), and in the alternative condition she knows that the punishment will have an
effective impact on the partner.
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iterated prisoner dilemma game (Rilling et al., 2002). The neural substrates of coop-
erative behavior and the specific impact of human exchange on brain are under scrutiny.
For this purpose, they contrasted the sessions of the game played against a computer,
with the sessions played against a human being. They observed that the frequency of the
mutual cooperation outcome is significantly lower in the computer session. Moreover,
an emotional process is associated with reciprocity, to wit the observation of symmetric
outcomes – mutual defection and mutual cooperation – vis-a-vis asymmetric ones. Actu-
ally this emotional reaction seems to be more salient in the case of positive reciprocity.
This echoes the results achieved recently in an experiment led by Tania Singer and al., in
which the vision of faces of intentional cooperators activates the insula region, in addition
to the amygdala, the striatum, and regions commonly associated to social cognition and
its corresponding inference process. This activation is found to be more important than
the one while facing faces of intentional deviators (Singer et al., 2004a).
Besides, a masking procedure33 reveals that this specific activation is not observed
in the computer session34. This result is consistent with an analogue observation made
by Cohen and al. in the ultimatum game experiment previously evoked: for the same
amount of unfairness the emotion response is stronger when the second partner is human
than when he has been replaced by a computer35.
What’s empathy? The previous experiment suggests that human interactions are mul-
tidimensional and cannot be encapsulated without integrating the limbic component and
fleshing out its interactions with cognitive mechanisms. To that extent, a last example
of the recent contribution of neuroeconomics to social science is an fMRI experiment
run by Tania Singer and al. to investigate the nature of empathy – Cf Singer et al.
(2004b) and Singer and Fehr. When the subjects of the experiment learn that their
lover is going to suffer a painful treatment, a specific activation of the anterior insula
and the anterior cingulate cortex is observed. As these two areas are known to be the
affective components of the «pain matrix», this observation leads to equate empathy with
self-pain. This finding is consistent with existing results in the same research field, and
definitely constitutes a major step to understand empathy feelings.
Therefore it seems that social exchange rests on a social-emotional experience. Stan-
dard economics, by equating mutual cooperation in an iterated game with a «grim-trigger
strategy», might be relevant to understand a collusive relation between firms, but defi-
nitely not to shed light over social interactions. More generally the utilitarian trade-off
model might be irrelevant to understand lots of our actions, not only because it involves
a cognitive process that is not necessarily possible (bounded rationality), but also be-
cause emotion plays a major role in the decision-making process, especially under some
circumstances. For example Jonathan Cohen, Joshua Greene and al. have shown the
33The idea is to look at an eventual activation of the regions which have been found to be significantly
activated in the first stage.
34Conversely the orbitofrontal cortex appears to be an overlapping region.
35A specific activation of the anterior striatum is also observed during the decision-making period, when
the choice to cooperate with the human partner is made. This is another cue suggesting positive
feelings towards the human partner.
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importance of emotional mechanisms in moral dilemmas involving a conflict between
the cognitive (rational-utilitarian) goal and the gut reaction related to the emotionally
unacceptable choice (Greene et al., 2004).
Hence neuroeconomics, by incorporating the emotional dimension – more precisely the
interactions between cognitive motives and emotional ones, makes the observed phenom-
ena much more graspable.
4 Neuroeconomics as real syncretism
4.1 Widen the scope of economics
True, it may be extremely fruitful to flesh out compelling questions arising from the
gap between some theoretical premises and experience. Nevertheless the abductive path
brings about both an ontological critic and an epistemological one. First, in the abductive
perspective the way economists use neuroeconomics data has the drawback to rationalize
theoretical models – by sharpening them up – instead of real behaviors. Second the ab-
ductive process leaves aside important questions36 and is only a portion of an enveloping
set of questions: economics should not limit to its – historically – designated «Smithian»
objects37. We advocate rather an expansion of the scope of economics, and point to
Karl’s Popper «rationality principle» as cementing the relation between neuroeconomics
and the theoretical domain. This paradigm, backed by the realistic ethos (defined as
the motive to provide reasons for observed puzzling phenomena), declines itself through
two main aspects: one is methodological, the other is institutional. The methodological
manifestation of the Popperian rationality principle is the shift from deduction to induc-
tion. The relation between the a priori domain and the experimental domain is reviewed:
henceforward neuroeconomics is exploratory, while economics models are no longer in-
quiry engines, but rather ex post heuristic devices serving to understand the empirical
observations38. Theoretical contributions to established psychological facts still exists.
For example, Ronit Bodner and Drazen Prelec (Bodner and Prelec) have fleshed out
the self-signaling motive put forth by George Quattrone and Amos Tversky in the article
mentioned before. They construct a «diagnostic utility» directly echoing the «deceptive
diagnosis» observed empirically. In the same vein, Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole’s
models related to the self construction process, also focus on personal rules and self-
deception39. The insights they provide constitute important heuristic devices, evidently
helpful in the opening of the «black box» of human psychology. Might neuroeconomics
findings entail similar theoretical contributions in the future.
The institutional aspect is the unification of behavioral sciences. This motion – char-
36Because the interpretative leeway depends necessarily on the theoretical premises.
37These inherited objects are basically those of social sciences, for instance social exchange, cooperation
and trust...
38The latter are not a priori constrained, to the extent that specific experimental data may contribute to
provide those local justifications that are needed in view of a full account of human behavior. Thus
the expansion of the scope of economics is intrinsic to the inductive perspective.
39See in particular Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Benabou and Tirole (2004).
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acterized by a syncretism with neurologists, psychologists, philosophers – has already
started. Below are some examples to convince the reader it is the case.
4.2 Examples of new investigations
Cognitive control and the construction of feelings Rilling and al.’s experiment sug-
gests that social exchange rests on an emotional experience. On the other hand it also
puts forth the important contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex in the cooperative choice.
The delayed reward of cooperation certainly involves some «forward-looking disposition»,
that would inhibit the selfish impulse to defect – to get the immediate reward. Actually
this interpretation is consistent with studies tending to show the essential role played
by the ventromedial frontal lobe in the control of emotion. The emotional stimulus is
not a feeling – implying some degree of consciousness – before the intervention of the
the ventromedial frontal lobe. This means that an impairment between this region and
the limbic system damages learning from the emotional experience. This is salient in
the famous «gambling game» (Damasio et al., 1994). In this experiment the subjects
are asked to choose between four different packs of cards. Two of the packs are asso-
ciated with a nice payoff of 100 dollars, but occasionally one must repay 1250 dollars,
whereas the other two packs provide a comparatively modest payoff of 50 dollars, but
the repayment involves only minor sums. The subjects ignore the cards composition of
the packs. They play 100 trials. In practice the choice of the two first packs provides
systematic «bad news», hence normal subjects basically try the risky packs during the
first trials, then they prefer the other packs. They develop a hunch, learn from expe-
rience. Conversely the subjects suffering a damage in the ventromedial frontal lobe do
not learn that there is a danger associated with the choice of the risky packs and they
continue to choose the «bad packs» throughout the trials even though they lose a lot.
This is due to the fact that they have the emotion following «bad news» – when making
the risky choice – but not the feeling ; hence they do not have the motivation to modify
their behavior40.
Hence cognitive control is a manifest object of interest for behavioral economists, not
only to flesh out typical economics themes such as compulsive gambling and inefficient
risk taking, in addition to the study of social exchange and trust, but also to understand
other psychological puzzles. For instance, the distinction between feeling and emotion
allows some new insights related to the control of pain. In a famous article related to
«deceptive diagnosis», George A.Quattrone and Amos Tversky show that people select
actions that are diagnostic of favorable outcomes even though those actions do not cause
those outcomes (Quatronne and Tversky, 1984). This is clear in the following exper-
iment. In a control condition subjects are asked to immerse their arm into cold water,
and their tolerance to coldness is measured. Then the experimentalists divide the sub-
jects into two random groups – let’s say A and B. At an intermediary stage, group A is
informed that a higher tolerance to cold water is a sign of a long, healthy life, whereas
group B receives the opposite piece of information – to wit the less tolerant one is, the
40For a very clear presentation of this experiment, see Kandel et al. (2000), p 994.
15
more healthy he is likely to be. Follows the experimental condition: subjects are asked to
do the tolerance to coldness test again. The striking result is that the tolerance of group
A subjects (those who have been told that a higher tolerance to cold water was a sign
of a healthy life) typically increases; and symmetrically, the dominant pattern for group
B is a decrease in the tolerance to cold water, as compared with the initial condition
(which serves as a benchmark).
The interpretation made by the authors to explain the changes in the physiological tol-
erance is that subjects have a «calvinist motivation» that leads them to choose behaviors
signalling good outcomes, even though they are aware that these actions do not facilitate
the occurrence of these future outcomes. For this comforting process to be at work, the
subjects must ignore the fact that they are selecting the action for being a good signal
of future destiny. They must be pure behaviorists who neglect the inner mental states
originating the action. A denial is necessary, hence the expression «deceptive diagnosis».
Now we stress the following point: while a self-deceptive «cheating» might well ex-
plain group B’s decreasing tolerance to cold water41 group A’s increasing resistance to
coldness is a real puzzle, since during the benchmark condition, subjects did their best42.
Therefore, for those who resisted more the second time, some objective change must
have occurred. Neuroeconomics should definitely explore this phenomenon. The dis-
tinction emotion (automatic)/feeling (involving neocortex) might help to pin down the
mechanisms that are involved.
Quattrone and Tversky’s paper had a big impact on behavioral economics. Hopefully
it shall have a similar influence on neuroeconomics.
Rationality Neuroeconomics seen, partly, as a continuation of the economics and psy-
chology programme and as a specific experimental development of behavioural economics,
bears a special interest in the investigation of the neural bases of cognitive biases and
limitations. One can try to look at the neural underpinnings of the cognitive defects while
cognitive tasks are being performed in order to flesh out the hypothesis that the auto-
matic (intuitive) response associated to directly accessible mental representations (the
intuitive contents of mind) leads to the error, when the mind does not detect and correct
the automatic response (Cohen et al., 2004). This hypothesis, defended by Daniel Kah-
neman who sees many of the psychological biases he has attracted the attention to as
falling under this characterisation (Kahneman, 2003), is also referred to by some as the
«dual process theory» (Stanovich and West, 2000) or again the System 1/ System2
view of the mind. An alternative possible explanation for the error is a deficiency of our
cognitive systems, whose limited capability restricts the ability to make right calculation,
for example. In that prospect a fMRI experiment using Shane Frederick’s Bat and Ball
problem is currently being run by the authors. Its main goal is to to explore the nature
of the cognitive defect in that particular case. Subjects are asked to answer the following
question:
41Unconsciously, one convinces oneself that coldness cannot be suffered any longer, while physiologically
one could resist more.
42They had no reason to falsify their tolerance to cold water.
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A bat and a ball cost together 1 $ 10, the bat costs 1 $ more than the ball.
How much does the bat cost?
About 70% of subjects give the wrong intuitive answer 1$ even when the correct answer,
1 $ 05 is made salient and available in different ways. It is predictable, as other studies of
neural underpinnings of cases of contrasts between System 1/ System 2 types of answers
have shown, that we observe, when the intuitive answer 1 $ is given, significant activity
in the parietal or temporal lobe (Goel (2003) and Goel et al. (2000)). In the case of
the non-intuitive, effortful, condition, the right prefrontal cortex should be significantly
activated.
Experiments on such cognitive biases, failures or limitations, make sense in a widened
view of what neuroeconomics can ascribe to itself as a conceptual and epistemological
goal. In other words one important aspect of the endeavour of bringing forward a new
hybridization of sciences is to acquire a better sense of the natural basis of our various
normative definitions of rationality. It is important to know whether a subject is in
principle capable to accomplish a cognitive task or whether she is neuronally wired in such
a fashion that the chances that the task be standardly fulfilled are quite low. In the case
of the Bat-and-Ball problem the apparent paradox is that the standard accomplishment
of the task is not so cognitively costly, as any numerate subject, in particular when put
in front of the solution, is capable to recognise it. Yet most subjects fail to solve the
problem. The presence of two separate available cognitive approaches to the problem at
hand, linked to two distinct neural circuits triggered according to the different elicited
answers, points in fact to a certain level of indeterminacy in the application of the
normative notion of rationality to actual cognitive performances. It is of epistemological
importance to determine whether we face, in the case of a systematic biased response
corresponding to the use of some available cognitive and neural resources, a serious
cognitive limitation or rather the use of a heuristics that leads to wrong or sub-optimal
results but that can be bypassed when the good conditions are met or the right signals
sent.
One aspect of the debate, as one can foresee, is the nature of bounded rationality. In
a certain vision of Simon’s Bounded Rationality Paradigm heuristics are fast and frugal
procedures that lead generally to correct outputs and are related to neural mechanisms
and processes. In particular emotions can be viewed as a type of neural mechanisms
that short-circuit the more cognitively costly information processing that would lead to
18 optimal decision making (Muramatsu and Hanoch, 2005). The presence of serious
cognitive deficiencies would not flatly point to the coexistence of two types of mind or
mental systems, but it would raise the question as to know whether we continue to call
rational, even «boundedly rational», any contribution of the mind that, in spite of its
intrinsic cognitive low-cost, can lead to far from correct and satisfying outputs. One goal
of neuroeconomics, through the systematic study of psychological biases that has long
interested behavioural economists, is then to help draw the boundary between what can
reasonably be called rational behaviour or cognition – and be, as such, introduced in
standard economic models – and what cannot.
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